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Abstract:   A dramatic problem facing the concept of the self is whether there is anything to 
make sense of.  Despite the speculative view that there is an essential role for the perceiver in 
measurement, a physicalist view of reality currently seems in many respects to be ruling out the 
conditions of subjectivity required to keep alive a concept of the self.  Eliminative materialism 
states this position explicitly.  The doctrine holds that we have no objective grounds for 
attributing personhood to anyone, and can therefore dispense with the concept.  This 
conclusion would require us to dispense with many of the most basic commitments of our 
manifest or common sense image of the world.  And it would require us to abandon, to 
maintain as an act of bad faith, or radically to adjust, virtually every significant basic 
commitment underlying the variety of traditions that have evolved historically from the 
(natural) platform of common sense.  Daniel Dennett’s sympathies seem to be divided over this 
issue.  He is reluctant to eliminate the most fundamental linguistic-conceptual-institutional 
commitments that have evolved from common sense.  Yet, I will argue, the basis of his support 
for these, beneath the surface of his rhetoric, is a mirage.  His view of persons and related 
(intentional) concepts is a case in point.  In place of the eliminative materialist position, Dennett 
recommends that we regard the self as a highly useful “theorist’s fiction.”1  He adopts a similar 
epistemic stance toward intention, belief, mind, and so on.  In this paper I aim to show that 
Dennett’s recommendation is based on a subtle version of the dualism of subject and object (or 
scheme and content), which he seems to agree that we should transcend.2  Against Dennett’s 
view of the self as a “theorist’s fiction,” I argue in favour of a version of Donald Davidson’s 
realist thesis that, once we properly appreciate the significance of abandoning this pervasive 
dualism, we can maintain the self and associated intentional items – belief, mind, and so on – 
within a thoroughly realist ontology.  
 
1. Personhood and the sciences 
The concept of the person has been a concern of philosophy since philosophers began 
speculating over the Delphic maxim “know thyself.”  But it is becoming tempting to think that 
personhood and related concepts – e.g., intention, agency, value, belief, and mind – will not 
survive scrutiny from the physical and social sciences.  Research in the overlapping fields of 
evolutionary psychology, neuroscience and cognitive science has perhaps already undercut the 
basis of the concept of the person, or shown it to be an illusion.  That would be a remarkable 
event.  For the concept of the person is not a concern of philosophers alone.  The fate of this 
concept affects the wider field of human interests at a fundamental practical and conceptual 
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level, underlying, as it does, our concepts of morality, our institutes supporting rights, justice, 
and the rule of law, our most intimate manifest image of ourselves, and the basis of the natural 
languages with which we encounter reality.  When we consider the foundational character of 
this last interest, language, which underlies all our interests, it becomes clear, I hope to show, 
why we should reject as unintelligible the assertion that our concept of the person is illusory, 
notwithstanding what scientific research has to tell us about our evolutionary origins, genetic 
structure, neural and brain activity beneath our behaviour and thought, analogous 
computational processing, and so on.  
I will start by considering a compatibilist theory of persons that suggests that scientific and 
technological developments only threaten an antiquated, implausible concept of the person, 
one which presupposes such burdensome metaphysical notions as an objective moral order 
and free will.  From this standpoint, we might take comfort in the likelihood that research 
programs in these areas will someday coalesce around a revised conception of the self, based 
not on the illusory metaphysical presuppositions of linguistic traditions, in which we happen to 
find ourselves enmeshed, but on the harmonised results of approaches that will encourage us 
to re-evaluate the significance of our manifest, common sense self-image and to bring this 
image in line with “a scientific understanding” of reality.  We might then, as that useful day 
arrives, have and keep our cake, use (revised) traditional terms associated with intentional 
concepts, such as value, personhood and agency, while eliminating their metaphysical 
associations.  Daniel Dennett is a spellbindingly able advocate of this position. 
The program of revising, in this way, concepts of our linguistic tradition(s) is tempting if the 
only alternative is to sit back and observe the incoming tides of unmediated scientific discovery 
as they erode basic moral, aesthetic, existential, and institutional commitments that depend on 
these concepts.  In a recent book review, Daniel Dennett hints at the far-reaching significance 
of this problem when he says that the discovery that “free will is an illusion [would promise or 
threaten] to render obsolete a family of well-nigh sacred values:  just deserts (for both praise 
and blame), guilt, punishment, honour, respect, trust, indeed the very meaning of life.”3  
Dennett clearly appreciates the practical stakes involved in dispelling central conceptual 
commitments of our traditional self-image, in this instance free will.  With respect to free will 
and other foundational concepts, he has taken on a rather large public role as mediator 
between our traditional and scientific images of the self.  In this role, he has offered a basis for 
developing revised naturalised, non-metaphysical versions of central concepts of the manifest 
image of the self that our various traditions picture as metaphysical in character.   
* 
It might seem to be more sensible and clearer to leave aside the idea of linguistic tradition, 
and to refer simply to a tension between common sense and science, between our manifest 
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and scientific images of reality.  But there is a sense in which our common sense, manifest view 
has a history, which becomes embedded semantically, even syntactically, within our language.  
Those embedded linguistic changes that influence our common sense are what I have in mind 
by a tradition.  Science clearly plays a significant role within our current tradition.  But it may be 
premature to insist that a scientific point of view can, even in principle, exhaust our 
understanding of reality, or that we will ever be in a position to eliminate the metaphysical 
presuppositions of foundational concepts within our common sense tradition.  Accordingly, in 
the discussion that follows, I will resist the rhetorical practice of Dennett and others of referring 
to concepts implied by ordinary linguistic use that do not align with a “scientific understanding” 
as the products of “folk psychology,” as that convenient opposition encourages us to deal too 
offhandedly with the non-parochial metaphysical presuppositions of many of the basic 
concepts of our tradition, and of course to foreclose on the main issue under discussion. 
2. The self as a “theoretical fiction” based on real-world patterns 
Grammatically, writing about the self seems to incur a formidable challenge, since we can 
scarcely think or talk about the concept without referring to ourselves, and referring to 
ourselves as subjects.  Further, the widespread view that language involves intersubjective 
communication is reinforced by this seemingly unavoidable presupposition:  that the entities 
who use language, as a scheme for achieving mutual understanding, actually are subjects.  If 
they were not subjects, it would be hard to imagine how their intentional acts of 
understanding, as opposed to the transmission of bits of data that might be understood, could 
ever come to pass.  To avoid the implications of syntax or of language described as an 
intersubjective activity involving intentional states and agents, which force on us the existence 
of the thing and sorts of things we are questioning, it might be reasonable to regard the self as 
a hypothetical object, a device operating beneath considerations of ontology, until we can 
independently assess likely grounds for asserting or denying the existence of selves, or for 
revising our understanding of the concept.   
Dennett’s theory of personhood moves beyond this merely provisional stance, asserting 
that the self is permanently to be understood as a highly useful, theoretical construction, or, as 
he says, a “theorist’s fiction.” 4  As a theorist’s fiction, the self is not being put on a par with 
fictions which are mere inventions or illusions, e.g. Sherlock Holmes or unicorns.  The kind of 
fiction Dennett has in mind instead is analogous to such theoretical constructs as gravitational 
centres or the Equator.5  By regarding the self as a theorist’s fiction, he is neither eliminating 
the idea of the self nor adopting a realist stance toward selves, regarding them as 
unambiguously real.  Instead he is advancing the position that these two options present a 
dilemma which we can get past by accepting a doctrine of “mild realism.”6  In effect we accept 
this view, when, using Dennett’s sense of the term, we adopt “the intentional stance” towards 
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actual (physical) or semi-actual (designed) entities; we commonly attribute intentional states to 
these entities without having an explicit opinion about whether these entities actually possess 
such states – beliefs, wishes, and so forth – or whether such states exist in some more 
substantive sense, physically or metaphysically.  By formally accepting the intentional strategy, 
we can thus attribute intentional states to an indefinitely large range of entities – e.g., from 
hominids and bats to thermostats – and thereby cope somewhat successfully with their antics 
and behaviour, without worrying about the status of their underlying physics as we arrange our 
predictions, and without being seduced by murky metaphysical explanations.  Instead, the 
intentional stance has us regard real-world patterns associated with such entities merely as 
though they were harbouring the presence of intentional properties.  Since the stance lets us 
better predict the behaviour of these patterns and entities, unlike the creation of pure fictions, 
e.g. unicorns, an intentional concept can thus sort of refer to something real; it can refer to 
underlying real patterns onto which we only somewhat arbitrarily attach our theoretical 
predicates. 
In taking the intentional stance we remain agnostic, perhaps mildly agnostic, about the 
reality of beliefs, wishes, values, etc., and the selves which collect these items in interesting 
ways.  We only adopt the intentional stance because, Dennett says, the physical stance – which 
would have us trying to predict the behaviour of patterns that suggest selves from 
“neuroscientific levels of description”7 – would leave us with a computational headache.  The 
intentional stance involves treating selves as real, even though, at the physical level – which 
trumps the intentional level8 and in principle eliminates it – they are not real, at least if we 
insist on speaking of everything as either real or unreal.  In place of that antiquated doctrine, 
Dennett recommends that, in the special case of intentional objects, we accept the category of 
“quasi existence.”9  
3. “Quasi existence” and the dualism of scheme and content 
The quasi existing things of Dennett’s intentional stance have no ontological significance in 
the traditional sense, even while they maintain their familiar conceptual position in our 
language.  The term “mild realism” thus seems to inflate the status Dennett has in mind for 
beliefs and selves.  It might be clearer to drop talk of realism about intentional concepts 
altogether.  Dennett confines “realism,” however, to a “natural ontological attitude” that has 
already excluded “opinion about the ultimate metaphysical status of physical things or abstract 
things (e.g., - electrons or centers of gravity).”10  The “natural ontological attitude” seems to be 
in keeping with Donald Davidson’s rejection of the dualism of (linguistic; theoretical) scheme 
and (empirical) content.  That dualism entails the doctrine that we can make sense of the idea 
of reality apart from our schemes, whether construed as unprocessed empirical data, 
uninterpreted experience, or the thing in itself.  In this and following sections, I will suggest 
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that, notwithstanding his exclusion of the ultimate status of things, Dennett’s “mild realist” 
policy lists towards this untenable doctrine.11 
The idea of existence coming in degrees or grades seems to depend on a non-relative idea 
of reality, however we characterise it.  But a non-relative idea of reality does not readily 
support the idea of degrees of reality.  In this respect, Dennett’s decision to put aside the idea 
of ultimate reality begins to resemble a sceptic’s or a relativist’s effort to reject the idea of 
reality per se.  The idea of reality provides traditional scepticism and conceptual relativism with 
a hidden epistemic leverage with which to bring into question the reality of the world that we 
seem to encounter.  Traditional scepticism promotes blanket uncertainty by raising dire 
questions about whether our perceptual apparatus lets us experience the real world; various 
forms of explicit and unannounced relativism raise or suggest similar questions about whether 
our linguistic-conceptual schemes are systematically distorting reality, trapping us in our own 
parochial versions of reality, or missing reality altogether.  In his early essay “On the Very Idea 
of a Conceptual Scheme” (1974), Davidson sought to show that conceptual relativism, in all its 
forms, loses its grip on us once we give up the dualism of scheme and content.  Early in the 
essay he raises the paradox that we can’t make sense of differing relative conceptual schemes 
unless “there is a common co-ordinate system on which to plot them.”  The paradox Davidson 
was intent on underscoring is that “the existence of a common system belies the [relativist’s] 
claim of dramatic incomparability.”12  Davidson is well known for rejecting both ideas, for 
arguing, on the basis of his views of language, against the idea of a common linguistic-
conceptual system which just happens to capture ultimate reality, and against the idea that 
there are differing relative systems picturing different worlds.  I discuss Davidson’s view of 
language below;13 for now we might consider that Dennett is not so much14 committed to 
relativism construed as differing systems that each correctly picture the world, or differing 
worlds, but to a limited relativism in which not all relative schemes are equal, in which some 
schemes are more real than others.  This limited relativism seems to be a presupposition of his 
view that various epistemic stances describe reality in more or less fundamental terms.  
However, if Dennett is not tacitly banking on, while claiming to suppress, an idea of ultimate 
reality in contrast to relative reality, it seems odd that he should keep his view that some parts 
of reality are semi-real.  It is not entirely clear how, without ultimate versus less-than-ultimate 
versions of reality, he can make sense of the idea of degrees of reality, as opposed to the 
traditional view that objects either exist or they do not exist.  This point can be put in positive 
terms.  If limited relativism, which tacitly requires some spectral version of ultimate reality, 
goes by the wayside, we are left with the ordinary reality which we encounter with, as opposed 
to mediated by, our language, and so we are left with the usual things and streams of things – 
from physical items to intentional things, beliefs, other selves, and so forth – which shape, and 
in the broadest and most innocuous sense are shaped by, that language.15  On this view, no 
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class of things featured within the totality of our language provides the smallest point on which 
to leverage some piece of reality into an ontologically higher status, or to relegate other pieces 
to a lesser quasi-status.  We thus cannot maintain the idea of reality in degrees.  Instead, if this 
is right, we are left with an indivisible ontology, with a reality in which we are fully immersed, 
and, not incidentally, with beliefs about reality which are either true or not true.   
4. Cartesian dualism and a false dilemma 
Dennett suggests a motive for introducing different degrees or levels of existence, when he 
poses the following dilemma at the end of “Artifactual selves:  a response to Lynne Rudder 
Baker” (2014): 
The only alternative on offer to this vision of an emergent, virtual [or quasi-] self is an 
extremely dubious dualism of real (really real, I guess you could say) selves in real 
bodies, an idea that is about as antithetical to a scientific understanding of mind as élan 
vital was to a scientific understanding of life. 16 
So, for Dennett, the “mild realist” view of the self as a “virtual” or quasi existence is required if 
we wish to maintain “a scientific understanding of mind,” which is under threat from Cartesian 
dualism, or some similar doctrine.  This passage is surprising, because Dennett has, on other 
occasions, discussed a variety of non-dualist alternatives.  In “Real Patterns” (1991), for 
example, he mentions five non-dualist views of the self:  “industrial strength realism” (Jerry 
Fodor); “realism” (Davidson); “mild realism” (Dennett); “milder than mild irrealism” (Rorty), and 
eliminative materialism (Paul Churchland), which in effect denies the reality of selves.17   
The most straightforward way to maintain “a scientific understanding of mind,” or self, 
might be to deny the reality of these concepts.  Dennett’s disavowal of eliminative materialism, 
however, leaves him, he thinks (perhaps in an incautious moment), with a quandary in which 
either the self is a semi-real idealization or a window opens to the most extravagant non-
scientific views of the self, e.g. “[t]he idea of a mind-thingy that goes to Heaven when 
somebody dies.”18  As his survey of types of realism suggests, however, this is not a genuine 
quandary.  It is not a quandary if realism has already been rescued from the false opposition of 
scheme-entranced relativists who deny the idea of objective reality and content-obsessed 
realists who posit some version of a Kantian thing in itself.   
5. Pulling at threads 
Dennett has missed an important aspect of Davidson’s realism by misconstruing his fellow 
Quinian’s19 view of the role behaviour plays in making sense of language and the world.  While 
enlisting Davidson against a theory which “takes beliefs to be things in the head,” Dennett 
remarks that  
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Davidson and I both like [Paul] Churchland’s alternative idea of propositional-attitude 
statements as indirect “measurements” of a reality diffused in the behavioural 
dispositions of the brain (and body).  We think beliefs are quite real enough to call real 
just so long as belief talk measures these complex behaviour-disposing organs as 
predictively as it does.20 
By “belief talk” Dennett seems to mean talk which attributes belief to someone’s behaviour, 
especially, I assume (to keep Dennett roughly on the same page as Davidson), the person’s 
linguistic behaviour.  Davidson did take the view that understanding alien or idiosyncratic 
utterances (linguistic behaviour) involves, among other tasks, matching the utterances with the 
behaviour of the speaker.  It is misleading, however, to say that an interpretation of these 
utterances predictively measures the behaviour of organs.  This way of construing 
interpretation seems to be listing towards a reduction of these utterances to “the brain (and 
body).”  Davidson’s approach, however, avoids this construal of linguistic understanding, by 
keeping in sight three inseparable aspects:  the utterances of a speaker’s language; an 
interpreter making sense of those utterances and of the language to which they belong 
(perhaps to a passing language, a synthesis of the languages of interpreter and interpreted); 
and the familiar and unfamiliar objects of the world to which the speaker is more or less 
fluently referring.  When Dennett, on behalf of Churchland, says that an interpretation (belief 
talk) of the utterances (beliefs) of a speaker are “indirect ‘measurements’ of a reality diffused in 
the behavioural dispositions of the brain (and body),” he seems to be operating in the vicinity of 
Davidson’s triangulation of utterance-interpretation-world.  Nevertheless, referring to 
interpretations as “indirect measurements,” and as “diffused in the . . . dispositions of the brain 
(and body)” of the person to whose utterances the interpreter is ascribing belief, begins to 
dissolve one or more coordinates of the triangulation, for example interpretation and linguistic 
meaning, which are required by Davidson’s account to make sense of utterances and beliefs.  I 
won’t press this point, as I’m not quite clear whether Dennett means that this diffusion of 
belief-talk amounts to an elimination of belief.  But it is worth noting that Davidson has said 
that the concept of belief, alongside many other intentional concepts, is “essential to thought, 
and cannot be reduced to anything simpler or more fundamental,”21 e.g. “the brain (and 
body).”  It is also worth recalling that Davidson said, when distinguishing his views from 
Quine’s, that he “despair[s] of behaviourism.”22 
6. Indeterminacy and evidence 
After noting their (alleged) agreement, Dennett mentions that Davidson is more of a realist 
than he is about intentional concepts, such as belief and the self, and that he has “tracked 
down the source of this disagreement to a difference of opinion [they] have about the status of 
Quine’s principle of indeterminacy of translation,” 23 and by extension indeterminacy of 
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interpretation.  The principle of indeterminacy of translation allows the possibility that two 
equally resourceful translation manuals of some foreign language, e.g. Jungle, might prescribe 
contrary and equally adequate interpretations of the same utterances in that language, Jungle.  
Indeterminacy of interpretation extends this possibility to the home language, 24 so that two 
equally (but obviously not perfectly) justified interpretations of an utterance in the same 
language may be true.   
In “Real Patterns,” Dennett uses the following general example of indeterminacy, to 
explain why he is “less of a realist than Davidson” about beliefs:   
I see that there could be two different systems of belief attribution to an individual 
which differed substantially in what they attributed – even in yielding substantially 
different predictions of the individual’s future behaviour – and yet where no deeper fact 
of the matter could establish that one was a description of the individual’s real beliefs 
and the other not.25 
This quotation suggests two of the main ingredients of the scheme-content distinction:  
“different systems of belief attribution,” and absence of a “deeper fact of the matter” that 
shows which system describes “the individual’s real beliefs.”  All that is missing is an assertion 
that the “different systems” are untranslatable, which Dennett veers towards a few sentences 
later when he says that “[t]he rival theories [or systems] would not even agree on which parts 
of the world were [real] patterns and which were noise,”26 and at the end of his paper when he 
claims that “Davidson has overlooked the possibility of two or more conflicting patterns being 
superimposed on the same data – a more radical indeterminacy . . . than he had supposed 
possible.”27  The attribution of different patterns to the same data in itself is hardly surprising.  
A more dramatic possibility would be our inability to discern from the data and the rival 
systems of interpretation which data were encouraging acceptance of which system, the 
problem of inscrutability (or indeterminacy) of reference,28 which Davidson spent decades 
thinking about in conversations with Quine and others.29   
The drama of these problems begins to fade when we consider a point which Davidson 
has offered many times in essays directed at the related, dependent problem of conceptual 
relativism, namely that it is a mistake to conceive languages or systems of interpretation as 
fixed or impermeable over time.  Conceiving of language as a finished structure, it is natural to 
suppose that the terms and references of one language might be untranslatable in another.  
Where translation fails, we can coherently raise cases of two similar systems of interpretation 
standing in permanent conflict, and in which the data on which they superimpose patterns 
might never let us see why we should prefer one system, or, within indeterminate or noisy 
areas of potential data, even what system we were dealing with.  That would be quite a 
dramatic result, and if the data in question were the kind which normally encourages us to 
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attribute particular beliefs to others, we might despair that we have a basis for belief 
attribution, and so a basis for our belief that others have beliefs.  The drama would continue 
into the question of the self, as we would have no reason to suppose that we or they are selves 
if, in principle, at some level (invoking the idea of reality in degrees), the evidence we have for 
the existence of beliefs were to disappear.  The idea of a self, after all, requires an array of 
concepts, and indispensable among these is the concept of belief. 
As we have seen, for Dennett, beliefs, selves, and other intentional objects are 
theoretical fictions which we keep for purely pragmatic reasons.  He thinks that we “always can 
have in principle a non-Intentional, mechanistic account of the entity”30 if we resort to a more 
basic epistemic strategy, based on physical evidence.  We maintain the fiction of intentional 
objects only because the task of predicting the entity’s behaviour would otherwise become 
extremely cumbersome.  This view of the role of a basic epistemic strategy is the product of a 
mistake which Dennett seems to recognise, at least in part, as a mistake.31  The mistake is to 
assume that there is a direct correspondence between some isolatable set of sentences of our 
languages, systems, or epistemic stances, and the available empirical evidence.  The other 
mistake, which this assumption and Dennet’s view of distinct systems depends on, is tacitly to 
conceive language essentially as a fixed, impermeable, shared structure.  This view of language 
leaves Dennett imagining rival finished structures which each enable some avenues of thought 
and close off others, and hence wondering sceptically at the possibility of translation between 
conflicting schemes.   
Evidently, Dennett disavows this conception of language.32  Yet something like it must 
be true if we can make sense of his rival systems of conflicting belief attribution or pattern 
superimposition.  Dennett is stuck with such a conception if he wishes to maintain the drama of 
indeterminacy, because if the rival systems are not fixed, if their boundaries are permeable, 
then translation between rival schemes remains possible; and there is no reason to suppose 
that allowances for the terms and references of one scheme cannot be made by a radical 
interpreter starting with the other, as extensively as we care to imagine.  Neither scheme need 
be construed as an epistemic, let alone ontological, trap.  If an emissary from one scheme is 
sufficiently curious about the elusive objects of a rival scheme, radical interpretation will be 
required of her.  At various points, she will need to take seriously aspects of behaviour and 
speech which, in her language, count as noise, or as grotesque or mistaken belief.  Does that 
imply that she leaves behind her scheme or language on such occasions?  Yes, if we mean 
nothing more than that she leaves behind her language conceived as a permanently fixed, 
shared structure; but if we have given up this idea of a language, it is no longer easy to make 
sense of the question.   
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Dennett stipulates that these rival schemes divide up the evidence differently; they 
superimpose conflicting patterns on the data.  Does that arrangement impose a limit on radical 
interpretation?  Not a theoretical limit; nor a task different from the one already engaging the 
radical interpreter as she makes sense of the references of another language by adjusting and 
expanding her own set of references, guided by, among many other beliefs, her beliefs about 
logic, which constrain her adjustments and, if she is charitable, prompt her to keep pressing her 
adjustments in the face of incommensurate schemes.  It would only make sense to speak of an 
absolute limit on radical interpretation if we could make sense of pure evidence, or as Davidson 
might say “if we could give a non-linguistic characterization of reference,” but as he added, and 
as Dennett perhaps accepts, “of this there seems to be no chance.”33 
7. Monstrous belief or myopia 
Physical descriptions have no ontological priority over intentional descriptions if there is no 
chance to isolate reference from the rest of language, if reference in other words plays no 
independent role within the totality of our linguistic beliefs and theoretical activities.  Without 
this ontological priority, Dennett’s sceptical characterisation of beliefs and selves as semi-real 
things whose reality wanes as we descend to deeper levels of description, or take up more 
fundamental epistemic stances, is misplaced.  At this point, should we concede that a “scientific 
understanding of mind” is out of reach, and be prepared to make room for the monstrous 
concepts of an ontology abandoned by reason?  There may not be a general answer to this 
question.  However, I would say that the semi-eliminativist, positivist inclination to conceive 
such central intentional concepts as belief, value, and the self as a theorist’s fiction tends to 
create its own monsters; it certainly creates a myopic conception of reality.  That concern aside, 
the worry of a profligate ontology, unchecked by empirical evidence, facilitating production of 
grotesque or untenable beliefs – e.g., “a mind-thingy that goes to Heaven” – suggests a few 
misconceptions:  that concepts which are inconsistent with empirical evidence need be 
entertained; that all non-analytic concepts are derived from sensory data; and perhaps most 
telling of all, that the concept of truth has no constraining role to play beyond scientific 
inquiries. 
Rather than embark on distinct inquiries at this point (or attribute any of these views to 
Dennett), I will invoke Davidson’s view of the role of truth (or error) in radical interpretation, 
taken as the means by which we expand our language – the interpretive activities of our 
historical linguistic horizons – when facing alien or incommensurate beliefs.  Without a concept 
of error, there is a sense that we might believe anything.  It would be more coherent, however, 
to say that without a concept of error or truth the concept of belief would dissolve, or, at least, 
we would have no basis for belief.  Like radical interpretation, truth is forced on us if we wish to 
make sense of any meaningful description, descriptions that refer to our current commitments 
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and those that refer to alien views and attachments which currently defy understanding.  Each 
distinctly new candidate for belief that we make sense of when faced with an alien scheme 
presupposes adjustments in our language.  We would not be in a position to call a belief “alien” 
or “incommensurate,” let alone wonder whether it is grotesque or untenable, if we were not 
far along in this process.  But even if we are far along in our understanding, nothing in our 
adjustments requires us to expand the reign of grotesqueness and error within our expanding 
view of things.  We find ourselves in the opposite situation.  Until we can discover or create 
plausible grounds within the totality of our beliefs and interpretations of reality, we are unable 
to begin to describe properly an alien worldview, let alone dismiss or applaud its more radically 
dubious commitments.   
Welcoming new beliefs which cause us to adjust our core beliefs is thus an enormously 
involved task.  I think it is implausible, and possibly unintelligible, to suppose that the task could 
be so fluent that we would ever find ourselves in a situation in which our core beliefs suddenly 
are systematically displaced by new conceptions, certainly not if truth is applied consistently 
across all beliefs in the new totality, and we maintain the idea of a self that persists through this 
change.  This may be why Davidson once remarked that radical interpretation is as liable to 
“sharpen our perception of error” as it is to cause us to accept new beliefs. 
8. Radical interpretation and self-transcendence 
Only persons can apply radical interpretation, and the capacity to do so is essential to being 
a person.  Lacking an ability to incorporate into her existing beliefs radically new beliefs, 
including those which disrupt who she is, no human would ever have developed into a person.  
So, without keeping in place the idea of persons as having an ability to engage in radical 
interpretation, it is hard to keep the idea of a person in sight, even though a disposition to 
apply radical interpretation in the face of alien belief encourages a continual threat to the 
cognitive basis of a person’s identity.   
Nietzsche suggests an important aspect of this (existential) problem in his essay “On the 
Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” where he struggles with an apparent tension 
between the unhistorical and historical modes of consciousness.  “Unhistorical consciousness” 
and “historical consciousness” were terms he deployed to examine the idea that an individual 
(or a people or culture) might live more or less in the moment, enfolded in a closed 
(experiential-cognitive) horizon, or, alternatively, more among undigested and alien beliefs 
which continually require or tempt the individual to adjust her beliefs and thereby, if the 
attempt goes well, to expand her horizons.  After introducing this theoretical scheme, Nietzsche 
invites us to consider that “the unhistorical and the historical are necessary in equal measure 
for the health of an individual, of a people and of a culture.”34   
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It is not clear how seriously we are meant to take this division, since persons would 
cease to be persons if their horizons were closed, or not informed by an inherently unstable 
field of background beliefs or presuppositions.  I think Hans-Georg Gadamer was right when, 
reacting against Nietzsche’s formulation, he concluded that the very idea of closed or separate 
horizons is unintelligible.35  Nietzsche’s historical-unhistorical metaphor nevertheless might 
encourage us to reflect on practical quandaries, psychological and existential for instance, 
arising from the ongoing human activity of radical interpretation.  As we digest the significance 
of core beliefs or encounter new beliefs which affect the core, our psychological resilience 
might be tested, and the kind of life in which we are immersed will in effect have changed, 
possibly independently of behavioural clues discernible to others.  Dealing with psychological 
and existential quandaries is of course a normal part of the human condition.  It is an 
inescapable part if we see the human condition as entailing a trajectory into personhood, and 
regard a capacity for radical interpretation as indispensable an aspect of personhood as beliefs, 
wishes, values, and other intentional states or activities. 
Existential quandaries arising from radical interpretation might be germane to our 
inquiry about the ontology of the self.  For they sometimes play an important role in our 
performance as radical interpreters, and that performance heavily determines how we become 
a particular self.  The activity of radical interpretation of course need not play out in existential 
drama, and perhaps rarely does, at least not in ways that we appreciate well at the time.  
Gadamer suggests a less dramatic picture of the connection between radical interpretation and 
self-becoming when he describes the interpretive act of putting “ourselves in someone else’s 
shoes,” in the quite involved sense of becoming “aware of the otherness, the indissoluble 
individuality of the other person”:     
Transposing ourselves [in this sense] consists neither in the empathy of one individual 
for another, nor in subordinating another person to our own standards; rather, it always 
involves rising to a higher universality that overcomes not only our own particularity but 
also that of the other. 36 
Gaining a new perspective, on Gadamer’s account, requires the radical interpreter to overcome 
within herself some particular belief, aspect of sensibility, or interest in the world.  In that 
sense, she must change herself.  But we might wonder whether a new perspective or 
awareness of idiosyncratic features of the other person “always involves rising to a higher 
universality,” and whether an interpreter’s awareness of a radically new belief need bring a 
lasting change in her.   
The durability of the change naturally depends on many factors.  Since radical 
interpretation requires an effort to understand the alien belief as true, or to perceive why the 
belief is mistaken, the act or activity of radical interpretation may carry an existential risk, or a 
 
 
13 
 
risk to an individual’s way of perceiving and existing in the world.  Understanding the truth or 
falsity of alien beliefs, after all, requires adjustments among an individual’s own beliefs and 
linguistic commitments.  If her awareness of the alien belief is secured at the cost of a revision 
of her beliefs which changes how she regards various points of interest in the world, or ramifies 
through her beliefs in a way that causes other adjustments among her beliefs and propensities, 
her person, prior to achieving a new totality of beliefs and interests, will have become unstable.  
But then neither her new nor her old system is ever finished, at least while she is alive and 
experiencing the world.  So, with respect to the totality of her beliefs and values, her person in 
any event should be conceived as in flux. 
If we reject the idea of persons bound by closed horizons, the proposition that persons 
are not stable entities might be trivial, even though there is a sense in which an individual might 
or might not practice radical interpretation when faced with alien beliefs or more complicated 
ways of seeing older beliefs, or when considering the risks or labour of an inquiry that makes 
significant demands on her intellect or peace of mind.  An individual’s willingness and ability to 
undertake the demands of radical interpretation suggest a predisposition in favour of self-
overcoming, or of taking responsibility for the state of certain beliefs that define her outlook 
and ways of encountering the world, and for assimilating alien beliefs threatening or promising 
to change that outlook and disposition.  Nietzsche characterised this capacity as a sign of 
strength of a person’s “innermost nature.”37  Possibly taking his historical-unhistorical 
distinction too seriously, he nevertheless claimed that “this is a universal law:  a living thing can 
be healthy, strong and fruitful only when bounded by a horizon; if it is incapable of drawing a 
horizon around itself . . . it will pine away slowly or hasten to its timely end.”38   
We can make sense of this claim if we abandon the incoherent idea of a person bounded by 
a horizon, and instead refer to the inherent limits of her ability or her inclination properly to 
assimilate certain new beliefs, of the practical limits of an actual radical interpreter’s capacity to 
revise her beliefs and linguistic commitments and thereby to expand her worldview and 
language.  In this way, we can keep Nietzsche’s admiration for the capacity or “strength” of the 
radical interpreter more or less safe from his concern that the activity of radical interpretation 
undermines her prospects for staying “healthy, strong and fruitful” when her “horizons” are 
open to the alien.  To the extent that she is unable to make sense of alien beliefs and 
proclivities, they will not become part of her expanded view of things, let alone of her 
disposition and values.  Insofar as she can make sense, they have found a temporary place 
among the totality of her beliefs, and possibly in her disposition to act in certain ways.  What 
should we say if her cognitive/spiritual health, strength or fruitfulness diminishes?  Perhaps that 
her capacity for self-examination is unduly limited, or that it has become impaired.  Or that she 
is not resilient psychologically.  The issue in any case is not that the “horizons” of her beliefs or 
values are unstable; nor that she would be a healthier, stronger and more fruitful person were 
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she locked into a scheme from which she views and acts in the world.  These are not issues we 
should try to make sense of, unless we can make sense of the idea of a closed system of beliefs 
and values, and of a person existing in such a system. 
9. Self-overcoming, language and consciousness 
Radical interpretation is essential to being a person because self-overcoming is.  It would 
seem that radical interpretation can, in some sense, begin to work beneath the surface of self-
conscious reflection, e.g. when an individual changes core beliefs that affect how she perceives 
and acts in the world without explicit deliberation.  An individual can also change as a result of 
self-examination, perhaps in “a dialogue with oneself,” 39 and it may be that these two kinds of 
activities cannot easily be disentangled.   
In The Gay Science, Nietzsche ignores or overlooks this last thought when he 
distinguishes emphatically between features of the self which operate beneath consciousness 
to motivate action and the same features when they are, in some sense, translated into 
consciousness.  Drawing on this distinction, he offers the surprising doctrine that 
“consciousness does not really belong to man’s individual existence but rather to his social or 
herd nature”: 
Our thoughts themselves are continually governed by the character of consciousness . . . 
and translated back into the perspective of the herd.  Fundamentally, all our actions are 
altogether incomparably personal, unique, and infinitely individual . . . But as soon as we 
translate them into consciousness they no longer seem to be.40 
It is not difficult to see the basis of this view; it stems from a fairly blunt version of the scheme-
content distinction: 
Owing to the nature of animal consciousness, the world of which we can become 
conscious is only a surface- and sign-world, a world that is made common and meaner.41 
Nietzsche says that his intent is not to characterise the distinction of (linguistic) scheme, 
through which we become conscious, and (distorted) content as metaphysical in character; 42 
nevertheless, his account of consciousness bears all the hallmarks of the distinction: 
whatever becomes conscious becomes by the same token shallow, thin, relatively 
stupid, general, sign, herd signal; all becoming conscious involves a great and thorough 
corruption, falsification, reduction to superficialities, and generalization.43 
Language and consciousness here have become a kind of display case in which we see “a world 
that is made common and meaner,” which has been systematically distorted by language; and 
notwithstanding the facility with which the problem has been shown to us, we are evidently 
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bound by the semantic (herd) conventions which present this distorted world, and by the 
lamentable fact that we are conscious. 
It would take a bit of a procrustean manoeuver to bring Nietzsche’s and Dennett’s 
concept of the self into alignment.  But if we bracket Nietzsche’s proposal that the proper locus 
of the self is the unconscious, and take on board his view that a person occupies a “shallow, 
thin” version of herself in conscious states that are shaped by the influence of linguistic 
schemes, we are left with an idea of persons approximating Dennett’s virtual self.  Of course to 
keep this similarity we need to eliminate the idea of an underlying more authentic version of 
the self, which Nietzsche himself does on other occasions.44  In place of that mysterious idea, 
we can refer to unconscious neural activities; these activities are not the self but the cause of 
the behavioural patterns to which, according to Dennett, we attribute the theoretical narrative 
fiction of “the self,” an interpretive imposition that helps us predict future behavioural 
patterns. 
Can we maintain the idea of a self that is capable of transcending itself if we construe 
the self as a theoretical construct?  In his 1976 paper “Conditions of Personhood,” Dennett 
takes this capacity of self-transcendence to be a necessary condition of personhood.  And, in 
that paper, he says that to “be in a position to induce change in oneself,” one must be capable 
of “reflective self-evaluation,” taken as a form of “genuine self-consciousness.”45  He then, as 
we have seen, pulls the rug out from this possibility: 
There is no objectively satisfiable sufficient condition for an entity’s really having beliefs, 
and as we uncover apparent irrationality under an Intentional interpretation of an 
entity, our grounds for ascribing any beliefs at all wanes, especially when we have (what 
we always can have in principle) a non-Intentional, mechanistic account of the entity.46 
If there are no objective grounds even for attributing beliefs to any entity, then the idea of an 
entity which can consciously reflect on its beliefs, choose to reconsider its core values, and 
thereby “to induce change in [itself,]” does begin to look like a fiction.  Dennett concludes 
“Conditions of Personhood” by saying that “[w]hen such problems arise we cannot even tell in 
our own cases if we are persons.”47   
Whereas Dennett concludes in “Conditions of Personhood” that we cannot account for 
persons, his current semi-realist view of persons as a theorist’s narrative fiction falters because 
it cannot adequately account for the concept of self-transcendence.  The aim of the fiction is to 
permit a theorist to organise, for the purpose of prediction, the kind of behavioural items that 
we associate with persons.  The theorist, we are told, posits the fiction “in order to unify and 
make sense of an otherwise baffling complex collection of actions, utterances, fidgets, 
complaints, promises, and so forth, that make up a person.”48  We are told, further, that the 
 
 
16 
 
self thus posited is capable of “accumulating memories and devising plans and expectations.”49  
Conceptually, a good deal is being presupposed here, more or less what we ordinarily 
presuppose when referring to an actual person.  I would say that this theorist’s posit is 
indistinguishable from an actual person, unless all the concepts being called into service – 
“actions, utterances . . . complaints, promises, and so forth” – are pseudo concepts, or mean 
something very different from our familiar concepts.  That seems to be the case.  We seem to 
be dealing with the “shallow, thin . . . surface- and sign-world” concepts which Nietzsche 
invokes when describing his herd self, with the added twist that the fictional self is not 
conscious.  Or is it?  If the theorist’s self that Dennett describes is conscious, then his distinction 
between a theorist’s fiction and an actual self disappears.   
Being conscious in any case is not enough.  To be a person one must, as Dennett says in his 
1976 paper, be capable of the kind a self-conscious re-evaluation of beliefs and values which 
can induce us to change ourselves, our defining outlook, without which we would be incapable 
of understanding radically distinct utterances and points of view.  Without this capacity for 
radical interpretation, we would not be able to make sense of the “baffling complex collection 
of actions, utterances . . . and [other phenomena], that [actually] make up a person.”  This is 
the endpoint of Dennett’s account of the self.  For if we allow that the complex collection of 
intentional phenomena and locus of self-evaluation and change with which we each seem to be 
intimately familiar exists in our own case, we have in effect accepted that persons are real and 
not merely a theorist’s fiction, which after all need not be posited, in the sense just described, 
for the self to exist.   
10. A sceptic’s dogma 
Does the idea of a self that exists beyond a theorist’s construction re-open the door to a 
dualism of content and scheme?  Only if that idea entails the idea of an unperceived, un-
depicted self, or the self as a mysterious experiencing substratum.  Obviously the content of a 
person’s consciousness vanishes without some (self-) perceived, depicted form,50 since there 
would otherwise be nothing of which to be conscious.  Accommodating, and perhaps 
extending, the behaviourism which has beguiled Dennett, we might characterise the subjective 
contents of consciousness – beliefs, feelings, private wishes, etc. – as forms of inwardly 
perceived behaviour.  This characterisation undermines a substantive subject-object distinction, 
since any inner phenomena of consciousness which a subject perceives has an accessible 
semantic structure which can be communicated to other persons, especially since these other 
persons routinely discover kindred phenomena among the contents of their own 
consciousness, and do so with language.  This characterisation has another implication.  If we 
give up the idea of “unstructured content”51 and can therefore no longer make sense of the 
idea of categorically private content, when we refer to phenomena of consciousness we may 
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not need to distinguish between auto- and hetero-phenomenology, unless we wish to 
emphasise, for some reason, the initial proximity of content when describing or representing 
our own experience.   
With the self thus exposed to public scrutiny and interpretation, we could naturally differ in 
our opinions about what inner and outer phenomena or behaviour, if any, count as a particular 
self.  Even “in our own cases”?  Individuals presumably are sometimes mistaken or uncertain 
about what configuration of their beliefs, values, and actions count as their essential self at any 
moment, or over a life, especially when their opinion comes into proximity or collides with the 
contrary, perhaps acutely perceptive, views of others.  It is then not surprising that we should 
be unsure in particular instances, moment by moment or in later reflection, whether the 
identity conditions of an entity as variable as the self have been satisfied.  But perhaps we 
should step back from an examination of (inner and outer) behaviour, from a direct appeal to 
the observable phenomena of the self.  When expressing his doubt about whether we can 
“even tell in our own cases if we are persons,” Dennett focussed on the elusive condition of 
self-transcendence.  He was right to do so, as that condition of personhood presupposes other 
necessary conditions of personhood, such as rationality and language use.  And he was right to 
doubt that we could know, using exclusively behaviourist methods, whether the condition of 
self-transcendence is ever satisfied.  As he suggests, a sceptic might always pose contrary 
interpretations of what we observe, or question whether any interpretation of what counts as 
the self can gain a foothold.  Scepticism along these lines, however, is problematic, since it 
involves isolating sentences purportedly counting as direct evidence and pressing the question 
of their correspondence, which is the problem of indeterminacy of reference which we 
considered earlier.  I think we should take a broader approach to the issue of whether we ever 
satisfy the conditions of personhood, especially the elusive conditions of self-transcendence.  
The conditions of self-transcendence would seem to overlap with those of radical 
interpretation, and it may be that to be satisfied they require that radical interpretation can 
succeed.  So, let us consider the prospects for these conditions together.   
In particular instances, it is hard to know if an individual has demonstrated her ability 
radically to transcend her core beliefs and values, and therefore whether she has surmounted 
fundamental aspects of her identity.  An individual might, at some point of self-reflection, think 
that she has satisfied a condition that reveals her personhood, by bringing into question and 
changing some aspect of her beliefs.  But every direct assurance she can offer can be brought 
into question by a sceptic, who can reasonably persist in asking what beliefs or values are core 
to her identity, which interpretive scheme correctly identifies her (Dennett’s worry or 
challenge).  We might also wonder whether her potentially distorting language allows her to 
think beyond its confines, to let her assess radically her values in the face of values from which 
they fundamentally differ, or merely leaves her stymied among arbitrary configurations of her 
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old beliefs.  Confining herself to the (inscrutable, indeterminate) evidence at hand, it may seem 
that she will never be in a position to prove that she is not locked into her language and beliefs, 
and so it may seem that she can never gain a foothold against these kinds of sceptical queries.   
The first of these challenges can be addressed more straightforwardly than the second.  The 
claim that she is essentially stuck in her system of beliefs comes into conflict with the evidence 
of her memory, and her comparative judgement of her previous and present beliefs and values.  
That challenge should leave her unimpressed if she has no reason to distrust her memory and 
her judgement that she has significantly changed her beliefs.  A more general challenge, that 
her language is an enclosed system beyond which lies meaning inaccessible to her, need not 
undermine her assurance that sometimes she is capable of surmounting her worldview, her 
core beliefs and values and ways of seeing reality; it would merely imply, if successful, that she 
might develop in some ways and not in others.  But as we saw in section 5, it is not clear how 
such a challenge could be successful in a general sense; it would require us to picture language 
as an impermeable finished structure, impervious to radical interpretation, to actual 
interpreters, no matter how resourceful they might be.   
Dennett’s particular worry, or challenge, that someone else might attribute to her beliefs 
and other conditions of personhood from an incommensurable rival scheme is more 
interesting, though it is also burdened by the idea of an impermeable language.  Moreover, as 
we saw in section 5, buying into this challenge requires us not only to impose a theoretical limit 
on radical interpretation per se, but to accept the idea of isolated content or pure evidence, 
and therefore requires us, as Davidson would say, to “give a non-linguistic characterization of 
reference.”  But Dennett’s worry cannot easily be thrown over, as it presents the plausible view 
that others (lovers, neuroscientists, etc.) might, at times, understand aspects of you better than 
you understand yourself, and so be in a better position than you are to say what you amount 
to, or who essentially you are.  Even divested of the idea of incommensurability, this worry 
might weaken the prospects of personhood, at least in particular instances, perhaps to the 
extent that personhood requires that you are able to satisfy the conditions of self-
transcendence; for I suppose, in principle, others could sometimes be in a better position to 
change you than you are yourself – and an entity that is exclusively the outcome of the 
manipulations of others would lack the degree of autonomy required to count as a person.   
11. Indeterminacy and openness 
If self-transcendence is an essential aspect of personhood, as it seems to be in our principal 
or most influential traditions,52 the idea of a determinate, substance-like self, which features in 
some of these same traditions, would not make sense.  If we regard self-transcendence as an 
essential aspect of personhood, then persons, if they exist, are in flux, fixed it would seem only 
in relation to the development of their beliefs, values, and deeds.  Is there anything essential 
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about a self thus conceived?  It would seem not with respect to any collection of beliefs, values, 
or deeds, considered in isolation and fixed in time.  If self-transcendence is a condition of 
personhood, then a person’s current beliefs and values would seem to be essential only 
through a wider set of relationships, which minimally, I would say, include the beliefs and 
values from which these current beliefs have grown, and whatever deeds this evolving set of 
beliefs and values has motivated or prevented.   
This stream of events is consistent with a succession of selves, and there seems to be no 
method for deciding divisions among the prospective selves that can be attributed to our 
bodies over the most varied or uneventful lives, e.g., for the sake of ascribing responsibility on 
an ethical basis for various deeds and misdeeds.  As dramatic as this outcome may be, it does 
not entail an annihilating indeterminacy that extinguishes the very possibility of identity 
conditions for the self.  Contrary attributions of features which purport to define a person 
suggest a continuously uncertain area of inquiry, and of self-inquiry, in which competing 
narrative accounts can readily be brought into collision.  Does this situation undermine the idea 
of a coherent self?  Contrary inquiries and self-inquiries might misconstrue a particular self, and 
in some measure likely all do.  Yet the tensions which sponsor that likelihood also underwrite 
the very idea of a person.  Collisions of perspective about a self, whether originating to some 
extent within the self in question, or prompted by the queries, interpretations, influence or 
actions of others, play a constitutive role in the development of a person, by influencing the 
continuous re-evaluation of beliefs, values, deeds, reflection on deeds, and so forth, that 
underwrite self-inquiry and self-transcendence, and therefore the (ongoing) possibility of a 
person.   
Of course collisions, or exchanges, of perspectives between a self and another, or others, 
may contribute to forms of self-transcendence grounded in reality, or, alternatively, to 
arbitrary, self-deceptive or delusional forms of self-transcendence, though the latter possibility 
might impose a limit on how the word “transcendence” applies, and encourage us to think, in 
some cases, of personal change in a neutral sense, or to think of a person degenerating in some 
way.  Perhaps only an individual who reflects on such collisions within herself as a radical 
interpreter, motivated by charity and therefore constrained by the ideal of truth, or by a 
willingness to perceive error among her beliefs and values, can properly embody instances of 
self-transcendence.  This may tie the concept too closely to rational agency, another condition 
of personhood.  While persons must be construed as agents, they are not always busy satisfying 
the conditions of agency, deliberating and making decisions on a rational basis.  Exactly how 
persons change, for good or ill, is something of a mystery.  As I mentioned at the outset of 
section 8, self-transcendence (self-overcoming) does not seem to be a function of agency alone; 
sometimes it is founded in rational deliberation and sometimes not, or only distantly or 
obliquely. 
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12. Self-transcendence and physis 
A fairly telling observation to direct against the idea of virtual persons is that persons have 
bodies.  A virtual person is a theoretical construct, whereas we ordinarily regard a person as 
physically embodied.  It would be quite hard to disentangle how we encounter a particular 
person, let alone our interactions with her, from her body, e.g. her facial expressions or the 
movement of her limbs.  The beliefs, values, desires, actions, and so forth, that we attribute to 
a particular physical entity, a potential person, might be too chaotic, or our intuitive powers 
might be too impoverished, to lead us to posit a person.  But these intentional objects are as 
bound to physical reality, are as much part of nature, however we construe nature, as the 
physical entity to which we attribute them; and if we suspect that the chaos is minimal enough 
to meet the approximate criteria of personhood, the person whom we might then be justified 
in positing is as entirely physical as the observable physical parts of her animating body.  If we 
accept this assumption, it does not follow that we should reduce beliefs, values, desires and 
other intentional objects, right up to persons, to assemblages of neurons or to areas in the 
brain.  Intentional objects, certainly beliefs, also have a content or meaning, and so, short of 
eliminating them, they are not reducible to neurons or brain parts.  Instead we might keep our 
inquiry into the nature of belief, the self, and so on, open, maintaining a dualism of explanation, 
as Davidson suggests, while regarding beliefs, selves and physical objects as part of the same 
ultimate nature, whatever that might be.53   
Regardless of how we settle such ambitious inquiries, we should see beliefs and, obviously, 
values, wishes, desires, and persons, as inextricably bound to passions, which are inextricably 
tied to the body.  This would make less plausible the view that self-transcendence is simply, let 
alone exclusively, a rational enterprise, which suggests an absurdly narrow view of persons.  
Are we merely appealing to Hume’s famous quasi-irrationalist, quasi-emotivist dictum that 
reason is and ought to be regarded as the slave of the passions?  I think the distinction is more 
elusive.  The following question about our relationship to truth and belief suggests how we can 
regard rational belief as inseparable from the passions without seeing reason as subordinate:  
Does reason become the slave of the passions when we enlist reasons to confirm a belief, or is 
it that our passions are governed by reason when we come to accept a belief as true on rational 
grounds?  This is not a good question if there is no cleavage within us between the operation of 
reason and passion, if beliefs and related dispositions and operations have a cognitive and 
physiological dimension.  We are constitutionally impelled to prefer true beliefs over false, and 
it is rational to do so, at least if truth is essentially tied to reason.54  To be rational in this sense 
is to be grounded in the passions, which reflect both our cognitive and physical nature. 
There is of course a straightforward sense in which reason and the passions can come into 
opposition among our beliefs, though this sense refers to a conflict of desires in which some 
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desires fall more on the side of rational norms and knowledge than others; if beliefs are 
inextricably constituted by reason and passion, the opposition between these would not be 
categorical.  We could still reasonably say that there are times when the opposition is resolved 
in favour of reason.  We might, for instance, offer instances of self-transcendence in which 
rational passions prevail over comparatively less rational or irrational passions.  Naturally we 
could offer instances of the reverse trajectory.  Indeed it may seem mysterious why more 
rather than less rational beliefs should ever prevail, at least beyond the calculative dictates of 
survival and utility.  While it is hard (perhaps incoherent) to imagine anyone choosing and not 
merely professing beliefs which they are convinced are untrue, the activity of examining our 
core existential beliefs and seeking ways to falsify their hold on us does not seem to come 
naturally.  Beliefs descend on us without our consent, and those which we acquire from a 
standpoint of self-reflective thought and inquiry are enabled by the rest of our beliefs, which 
are mostly the unexamined product of a tradition, or of indoctrination.  Further, the remarkable 
transformation of a human into a person who can examine her beliefs very far at all is the 
outcome of lengthy historical developments of a variety of civic institutions and practices, and 
the development of elaborate forms of knowledge and methods of inquiry, all based on the 
platform of language.  The idea of persons as self-conscious agents capable of autonomous 
change thus might seem to refer to a highly artificial construction after all, a non-natural 
product of culture and language.   
This is Nietzsche’s position in The Gay Science, where, as we have seen, he argues that the 
social and linguistic nature of self-consciousness means that “the world of which we can 
become conscious is only a surface- and sign-world” in which the conscious self “becomes by 
the same token shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, sign, herd signal.”  His view of the self 
elsewhere tends to undermine this characterisation, for example when he presents, in the 
Second Essay of On the Genealogy of Morals, his famous hypothesis of the origin of the 
conscience as based in the “internalization” (repression; sublimation) of desire: 
All instincts that do not discharge themselves outwardly turn inward – this is what I call 
the internalization of man:  thus it was that man first developed what was later called 
his “soul.”  This entire inner world, originally as thin as if it were stretched between two 
membranes, expanded and extended itself, acquired depth, breadth, and height, in the 
same measures as outward discharge was inhibited.55 
Here Nietzsche takes the view that a fairly significant change in “man’s” nature occurred, at 
some point in his transition into civil society, which prepared the way for human intellectual 
capacities to develop as elaborately as they have.  He no longer seems to regard the “entire 
inner world” (consciousness) of humans who undergo this change as merely “a surface- and 
sign-world” in which the conscious self “becomes . . . shallow, thin, relatively stupid,” and so on.  
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Instead he suggests that the elaborate intellectual capacities of persons are both a product of 
history and thoroughly continuous with the nature of the self.   
13. Persons, thought, and the world 
How we construe this last point, which in some sense should seem unremarkable, may 
determine whether or not we should accept the view that the spiritual-mental activities of 
persons are theoretical add-ons, fictions spun out by our brains to account for the behaviour of 
entities which are not really persons, or as emergent states, the causally inert endpoint of a 
one-directional causal order.  Both views, I think, are mistaken, but the theorist’s fiction view is 
mistaken in two respects.  It shares with the emergent-state theory of consciousness and 
persons the defect of not being able to account for how persons can act in, or on, the world.  
More problematically, the theorist’s fiction theory replaces a metaphysical theory in which 
subjects and objects are ontologically distinct with a theory that only postulates objects.  The 
presupposition of this theory is that there is no subjective aspect of the world, really.  As we 
have seen, Dennett recommends that we postulate persons (subjects) and their various 
intentional states only in order to facilitate less cumbersome predictions of the physical things 
to which we attribute these conceits.  For practical reasons, on Dennett’s view, it would be 
premature to eliminate the subjective dimension of reality, but not in principle impossible.  This 
is one way to abandon subject-object dualism, a familiar enough option these days.  But it 
overlooks the most compelling reason for abandoning the doctrine, which, as we have seen, is 
this:  that there is no way to disentangle our theories and language from the reality we seek to 
understand. 
This motive for rejecting the subject-object distinction undermines naïve physical realism, 
but the reason for rejecting the distinction lends no support to a subjectivist theory of reality.  
Rejection of the distinction involves abandoning a metaphysical picture in which reality 
contains two kinds of things, but it does not entail preserving half the distinction, either by 
adopting naïve realism or subjectivism.  The holistic view of language and reference that 
motivates rejection of the distinction undermines replacement doctrines that would 
categorically dissolve the tension that we subjects commonly experience when we encounter a 
world of objects, and when we encounter ourselves and other subjects within, as part of, this 
same world.  Quine famously offered, in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” a critique of the doctrine 
that we can confirm descriptions of objects in the world by a direct, unmediated appeal to 
evidence, a conclusion which arguably Davidson took more seriously than his former teacher.  
This kind of appeal is doomed if we are unable to isolate our references to these objects, and 
our references to the kinds of evidence being invoked on their behalf, from the rest of our 
language and theories.  That we could do so, while retaining the meaning of these references, is 
hard to conceive.  A similar point can be made with respect to references to things that appear 
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to be distinctly subjective:  beliefs, desires, wishes, etc.  These, as much as quarks or quantum 
fields, cannot be made sense of in isolation from the entirety of our language and theories, 
even if particular inquiries within our understanding of reality have adopted terminologies and 
models in which few of our familiar (common sense and traditional) terms show up.  We can 
therefore reject the kind of direct appeals to subjective phenomena that would uphold a purely 
subjectivist theory of reality for the same reason that we reject a naïve empiricist’s direct 
appeal to evidence.  
This basis for rejecting the dualism of subject and object should encourage us to maintain 
the pre-scientific view that the world is much like we experience it, full of objects and 
experiencing subjects.  As subjects, we commonly experience a tension between our intentional 
subjective experience and the objects we perceive or infer, even if an intelligible understanding 
of the world presupposes an integration of subject and object.  This tension can be quite acute 
when we refer to persons, especially if we emphasise experiences in which a person feels 
“enslaved” by, or alienated from, her body, or vice versa, as the Body in Marvell’s poem “A 
Dialogue Between the Soul and Body” asks us to imagine:   
O who shall me deliver whole,  
From bonds of this tyrannic Soul?56   
The impossibility of the Body’s query/complaint – beyond the absurdity that a body queries or 
complains – suggests the futility of trying to collapse the tension we experience in ourselves, 
and in relation to other subjects, into one side or other of the dualism the poem brings into 
question.  The Soul’s complementary complaint that it is “hung up . . . in chains/ Of nerves, and 
arteries, and veins,” reinforces the suggestion from the other side, making it clear that any 
sympathies we might attach to the Body in its plight, or the Soul in its, will be left hanging on 
positions dissolved by the parody of the dialogue.     
Nietzsche’s theory of repression pictures the conscience as a “tyrannic Soul,” but it 
construes the “soul” as a collection and transfiguration of human passions, as thoroughly part 
of a unified and “improved physis,” not as a distinct kind of thing which eliminates passions and 
thereby transcends the body.  At the end of “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for 
Life,” Nietzsche extends this thought to the entire world of intentional objects, when he 
proposes that we view Greek culture: 
as a new and improved physis, without inner and outer, without dissimulation and 
convention, culture as a unanimity of life, thought, appearance and will.57 
There is sense in which a culture, like a worldview, does not exist; conceived as a distinct 
object, it is an abstraction whose intended reference dissolves under scrutiny.  There seem to 
be particular kinds of intentional experience only available to individuals who have developed 
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within the cultural forms of life of a society or a tradition.  But these are kindred abstractions.  
Along with the sort of things – practices, institutions, conventions – which populate cultures, 
societies and traditions, these abstractions have no independent meaning.  A virtue of 
Nietzsche’s proposal, it seems to me, is that it encourages us to think primarily of the 
individuals from whose intentional experiences we extrapolate, in order to think concretely 
about culture, society, tradition, convention, and so on.  Obviously individuals are influenced by 
their cultural and social circumstances, but if we reject the idea of fixed cultures, with “inner 
and outer” boundaries, we could then more simply say that individuals, in their development, 
communicate in various interesting ways with one another, sharing the content of their 
intentions and beliefs, and, in so doing, giving meaning to social practices and institutions.  
Moreover, if, following Nietzsche, we see this significance sharing “inner world” of the 
individual as transfigured physis, we would not merely be positing further abstractions, 
theoretical fictions or emergent sets of purely mental properties.  We would instead find 
ourselves near Davidson’s view that concepts such as “intention, belief, desire, and so on . . . 
are essential to thought, and cannot be reduced to anything simpler or more fundamental.”58   
This view is a corollary of Davidson’s general approach to language and ontology, which 
cannot be divorced from the reality of subjects, actual language speakers.  As we saw in section 
5, Davidson offers a theory of language in which the ability to speak a natural language, and 
therefore understand reality, requires subjects in two connected respects:  to say things about 
reality and to interpret what is said.  Utterances and interpretations, in Davidson’s theory of 
language, are co-ordinated (triangulated) with the world, and therefore with the truth of 
utterances and interpretations, or the possibility of their error.  Could we simplify Davidson’s 
theory, by subtracting the intersubjective requirement of language?  Even if we require a 
triangulation of utterances, interpretations and the world to explain linguistic communication, 
do we need to keep subjects?  For example, might not computers play the same role?  In some 
sense, after all, computers perform both these functions:  they generate statements and 
interpretations.  This is an intriguing possibility, and becoming clearer about the conditions for 
making utterances and interpretations might provide a baseline for considering the degree or 
sense that we attribute thought to computers.  The conditions for generating an utterance or 
an interpretation, however, make the prospects for their satisfaction formidable.  For 
utterances and interpretations that communicate and are understood entail thought, and if 
Davidson is right to say that concepts such as “intention, belief, desire, and so on . . . are 
essential to thought,” the prospects for intelligibly attributing thought to computers are 
negligible.  Accepting Davidson’s contention that intentional objects “are essential to thought” 
then makes exceedingly implausible the view that linguistic communication could occur without 
actual subjects. 
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The world and the concept of truth are also “essential to thought.”  And since “all these 
concepts (and more)”59 are essentially interrelated in the activity of language, it is natural, if 
Davidson is right, to think of subjects as essentially part of the fabric of the world.  That thought 
follows from the principal motive we have for abandoning the dualism of subject and object.  It 
might be more palatable to say that subjects are an essential part of the world insofar as 
creatures capable of thought have evolved.  I think that must be right.60  It appears that such 
creatures have evolved.  If some of these creatures have evolved an ability to understand 
utterances that require of them the kind of self-reflective thought and degree of autonomy 
assumed by radical interpretation, and on occasion show that ability, then, from as objective a 
standpoint as can be imagined, it is clear that persons sometimes appear in the world. 
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